Horthy Through the Historian's Eye

After 1945, two distinct images of Horthy emerged: the "breaking-away" Horthy during the coalition period, and the image shaped by the communist era. The "breaking-away" Horthy is depicted as a well-meaning but clumsy figure who tried to orchestrate Hungary's exit from World War II but failed due to his limited abilities. This portrayal grotesquely labels him a "horseback admiral," painting him as a benevolent simpleton whose capabilities fell short of his ambitions. Conversely, the communist-era image casts Horthy as the leader of the counter-revolution, commander of death squads that executed communist leaders, and a ruler who threatened Budapest's population with severe punishment. This latter depiction ignored the trajectory of his later career. Both portrayals either distort reality or bear little connection to the truth.

Horthy's naval career sheds light on the question of his competence. As the owner of a modest estate in Kenderes, without substantial wealth, aristocratic ties, or significant societal backing, and as a Protestant, he could not have become the Emperor's adjutant without exceptional talent. He later rose to the rank of rear admiral and served as the last commander-in-chief of the Austro-Hungarian navy. During the Hungarian Soviet Republic, he became the supreme commander of the National Army, effectively assuming a role of political dictatorship. The officer detachments of the National Army, rather than the Szeged government, constituted the real political power. As he advanced into Transdanubia, with the assistance of his uncle, the military district commander in Székesfehérvár, Horthy successfully oversaw a smooth regime change after the fall of the Soviet Republic. By the time he entered Budapest on November 16, 1919, he had become the de facto ruler of Hungary, with the National Army as the sole source of power.

From August 1919 to mid-1920, Horthy was the chief orchestrator of the "White Terror." His Szeged political staff, including figures like Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky, Miklós Kozma, and Gyula Gömbös, urged him to establish a military dictatorship. The landowning aristocracy and wealthy industrialists—such as István Bethlen, Pál Teleki, and Kuno Klebelsberg—advised him to assume the governorship, consolidate power, and stabilize the nation. Horthy chose this path, a historically significant decision that set the country's direction for the next two decades. Upon being elected governor in 1920, he betrayed the "Szeged idea" by disbanding the officer detachments and restoring the power of the landowners and industrialists.

The regime, anticipating the possibility of war, preserved rather than dismantled the forces of the counter-revolution. Although the detachments were disarmed, their organizational structures were maintained under various guises (such as MOVE, ÉME, the Turul Association, and the Order of Vitéz). These groups were integrated into the system, kept under control, and maintained in a mobilizable state.

Horthy's role in this system was one of integration: he had to unify landowners, Jewish industrialists, the gentry, and the far-right. He proved adept at this delicate task, earning acceptance across the political spectrum in Hungary. His aim was territorial revisionism, relying on German support without committing fully to Germany.

However, Horthy's integrative role faltered. By 1937, he could no longer control the far-right, which had become the independent Arrow Cross movement. During World War II, he became the key figure in Hungary's attempts to break away from German influence. He was aware of the Hungarian government's overtures to the West, and his ability to avoid detection by the Germans reflected his cunning. It is a noteworthy achievement that in 1942-43, Hungary maintained a relatively high standard of living, with an independent press, a functioning parliament, and a social democratic presence, despite discriminatory Jewish laws.

On March 19, 1944, Horthy's integrative role ended with the German occupation of Hungary. From that point, he became the leader of the faction attempting to orchestrate Hungary's exit from the war, a struggle marked by haste and indecision. The occupation paralyzed this faction, which later re-formed. Horthy must answer before history for what he did to Hungary's rural Jewish population and for what he failed to do to save them. While likely antisemitic, he relied on wealthy Jewish citizens for economic reasons, but the rural Jewish population that had immigrated later was not his concern. He sought to save Budapest's Jewish population, but his responsibility for the destruction of rural Jewry remains unclear. Notably, he thwarted the deportation of Budapest Jews by deploying a cavalry brigade against the gendarmerie poised to act.

The failed breakout attempt was characterized by disorganization and indecision, a reflection not of Horthy's personal failure but of systemic collapse. The regime could not function with its inherent undercurrents of civil war and terror. Horthy was not a Héjjas, Baky, or Szálasi, but he bore responsibility for their actions.

In place of the dismissive portrayal from the coalition era and the hateful image of the communist period, a neo-Baroque picture of Horthy emerges—one where grandeur intertwines with the bizarre.

Szabó Miklós "Horthy" in "Kapu"1991/8